Mo vs aube

One line: aube is a Node package manager in Rust (jdx, 2026) whose security defaults are the most complete client-side answer to the 2024–26 npm incidents. Robert asked what Mo can glean from it (session 3). It is a client over a registry it doesn’t control, so everything it does is a heuristic where Mo can have a rule. Read against Q17 and supply-chain-defenses.

What aube does, and the Mo verdict

  • A defaults table with a boundary per check. Every protection is listed with its default and whether it fails, warns, or needs opt-in; paranoid: true flips the whole strict bundle. Stable error codes (ERR_AUBE_MALICIOUS_PACKAGE, exit 48).[152]
    • Verdict: steal the form. Mo’s package chapter in spec/design-v0/06-packages.md gets the same table, and the package manager’s errors go in the Q9 error catalog. Mo’s difference: agents are the caller, so every “prompt the human” row is “fail; a human overrides”.
  • Trust policy no-downgrade. A version with weaker publishing evidence (staged approval > trusted publisher > provenance > none) than an earlier version is blocked. Versions already in the lockfile are trusted. A built-in list of 12 popular packages is exempted because their release process is inconsistent.[152]
    • Verdict: steal, moved to the registry. Mo’s registry refuses the publish, so no client ever needs an exceptions list. The built-in exemptions are what a client-only policy costs. It joins Mo’s rule that capability widening is a breaking change: trust and capabilities are both monotone across versions unless a human says otherwise.
  • Release age gate. 24 hours by default (3 days in their example), separate from a 30-day new-name quarantine. Non-strict mode falls back to the newest old-enough version; strict fails.[152]
    • Verdict: already have (Q17 layer 4, 3 days). Take the two-clock split: version age and name age are different gates. Take the fallback rule: mo update picks the newest version older than the gate rather than failing.
  • Four reputation signals on add: known-malicious advisory (fail), similar name against a 100K-name popularity snapshot compiled into the binary (did-you-mean, fail when non-interactive), low weekly downloads under 1,000 (prompt, fail when non-interactive), name created under 30 days ago (same).[152]
    • Verdict: steal all four as registry-side data served with the package index, since Mo has one registry. The namespace-aware similarity rule (compare basenames within a scope, full names across scopes) is worth copying exactly.
  • Malicious-advisory checks with a bloom filter. Live check on add/update/fresh resolution; a ~380 KB bloom filter (0.1% false positives) for plain reinstalls; a local mirror as a third backend. Each has a documented fail-open or fail-closed setting.[152]
    • Verdict: steal the bloom trick for mo build offline: the registry publishes a signed revocation filter; hits escalate to an exact check.
  • Block exotic transitive sources. Transitive deps may not come from git, paths or tarball URLs; only direct deps you pinned yourself may.[152]
    • Verdict: steal, stricter: in Mo no dependency bypasses the registry except a path dep inside the same repo.
  • Default-deny lifecycle scripts, a suspicious-script sniff, and a jail (Landlock + seccomp on Linux, Seatbelt on macOS; writes and network denied, reads unrestricted).[152]
    • Verdict: already have, by construction. Mo has no install or build scripts (direction 30), so the sniff, the allowlist and the jail have no job. The admitted hole, “reads remain unrestricted”, is exactly what capability parameters close. Mo’s manifest is what the sniff approximates.
  • Content-addressed store (BLAKE3) and find-hash: which cached packages contain a given file hash.[152]
    • Verdict: steal as mo find-hash over declaration hashes (Q10): given a malicious function’s hash, list every package version that contains it. Incident response in one command.
  • Pluggable scanner (Bun’s API), fail-closed on any failure, with the scanner’s environment scrubbed of tokens.[152]
    • Verdict: later. The fail-closed contract is right. Mo’s scanner hook, if any, is a Platform-less Mo function that receives the resolved graph and returns advisories, so it cannot exfiltrate anything.

What aube cannot do

  • It cannot know what a package does. Every gate is about who published it, when, and what its name looks like. Mo’s compiler computes the capability manifest.[152]
  • It cannot stop a script that reads secrets (reads are unrestricted in the jail).[152]
  • Its strongest rule needs a hand-maintained exceptions list because the registry doesn’t enforce it.[152]

What Mo takes (added to the Q17 answer)

  1. The defaults table with a boundary per check, and stable error codes.
  2. Trust is monotone across versions, enforced at publish time.
  3. Two gates: version age (3 days) and name age (30 days); mo update falls back to the newest old-enough version.
  4. Four reputation signals served by the registry; namespace-aware similarity.
  5. A signed revocation bloom filter for offline builds.
  6. No dependency bypasses the registry except in-repo path deps.
  7. mo find-hash over declaration hashes.

Sources

[152] https://aube.sh/security.html — aube: Security and related docs (raw/articles/aube-security-docs-2026-09-12.md)