Software Supply-Chain Incidents in Package Ecosystems, January 2024 – September 12, 2026
Purpose. Evidence base for package-manager threat modeling (Mo Lang). Every value below was taken from a page fetched during this research session, and the source link sits next to the value it supports. Cells marked n.a. could not be confirmed from a fetched primary source. Where two sources give different numbers for the same thing, both are reported.
Scope. npm, PyPI, crates.io, RubyGems, Go modules / proxy.golang.org, Maven Central, NuGet, VS Code Marketplace / Open VSX, GitHub Actions, and GitHub account/repo-level compromise.
Note on the “Ecosystem mitigation” column. Per the brief, only ecosystem-wide or platform-level policy/product changes are recorded. Fixes made by the affected project alone (token rotation, patched release, repo cleanup) are deliberately excluded and shown as n.a. when no registry- or platform-level change was tied to the incident by a fetched source.
Section 1 — Incidents (chronological)
| Date | Incident | Ecosystem | Category | Reach (as reported) | Detection | Ecosystem mitigation | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Published Jan 25, 2024; uncovered Mar 2025 | io.github.leetcrunch:scribejava-core:8.3.5 typosquat of ScribeJava, plus 6 dependent artifacts | Maven Central | Lookalike/typosquatting with OAuth-credential exfiltration; payload triggers on the 15th of the month | Malicious artifact “on Maven Central since Jan 2024” before discovery (Socket) | Socket Threat Research Team, static/behavioral analysis of published artifacts (Socket) | Aikido later recommended “the adoption of prefix-similarity namespace detection in Maven Central” after a separate 2025 Jackson typosquat; no Maven Central policy change tied to this incident (SC Media) | Socket |
| Revealed January 2024 | MavenGate — takeover of abandoned Java/Android library namespaces via expired domains | Maven Central / Gradle | Repo-jacking / abandoned-namespace takeover (“abandoned digital assets”) | Affected projects and applications associated with “Google, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, Adobe, LinkedIn, Netflix, and over two hundred other companies” (Checkmarx) | Security research write-up of abandoned-asset attack classes (Checkmarx) | n.a. | Checkmarx |
| Disclosed Mar 29, 2024 | XZ Utils backdoor, CVE-2024-3094, versions 5.6.0/5.6.1 | Linux distribution supply chain (Fedora, Ubuntu, Debian) | Long-game social engineering by a planted co-maintainer (“Jia Tan”) culminating in an sshd backdoor | Backdoor shipped in “Fedora, Ubuntu, Debian” pre-release/rolling channels; maintainer trust built over “~2 years” (Akamai) | Andres Freund, investigating a ~500 ms sshd latency anomaly (Akamai) | n.a. (distro-level, not registry policy) | Akamai |
| Malware first shipped Nov 20, 2024 (project created Sep 1, 2024); analyzed Nov 25, 2024 | aiocpa — legitimate-looking crypto-payment library turned infostealer in v0.1.13/0.1.14 | PyPI | Malicious version of an established package; attacker also attempted takeover of an existing project name | PyPI states “The project has been removed from PyPI”; version-by-version timeline published, no download count given (PyPI blog) | ReversingLabs detected malicious code in the package; PyPI Safety & Security team published the analysis — “RL researchers detected malicious code in a legitimate-looking Python package, aiocpa” (ReversingLabs); PyPI’s Safety & Security team published the analysis (PyPI blog) | PyPI denied the attacker’s request to take over an existing project name, and cited Trusted Publishers, Identity Attestations and SBOMs as the structural answer (PyPI blog) | PyPI blog, ReversingLabs |
| Oct 30, 2024 | @lottiefiles/lottie-player v2.0.5–2.0.7 hijacked via a leaked automation token | npm | Compromised maintainer credential (automation token bypassing 2FA) → crypto-drainer injected into a popular package | Sonatype reports the Lottie Player attack caused “over $723,000 in financial losses to at least one entity” (Sonatype) | Community reports of broken/suspicious behavior, analyzed by Checkmarx (Checkmarx) | Checkmarx’s framing — 2FA on the account did not help because a long-lived automation token could publish — foreshadowed npm’s later token lifecycle changes (Checkmarx, GitHub) | Checkmarx, Sonatype |
| Dec 2–3, 2024 | @solana/web3.js v1.95.6 and v1.95.7 | npm | Compromised maintainer account via phishing/social engineering → private-key exfiltration | ”more than ~350,000 weekly downloads”; damages “roughly $130K” per Helius CEO Mert Mumtaz (Socket) | Socket Threat Research and the Solana community; ReversingLabs used Spectra Assure differential analysis against safe versions (Socket, ReversingLabs) | n.a. | Socket, ReversingLabs |
| Dec 4–7, 2024 | ultralytics v8.3.41, 8.3.42, 8.3.45, 8.3.46 | PyPI | CI/build-pipeline compromise — GitHub Actions script injection + Actions cache poisoning; XMRig cryptominer payload | Two separate malicious release pairs; v8.3.42, “which was supposed to address the incident,” “ended up containing the same malicious code” (ReversingLabs). No download or install figure for ultralytics appears in the primary PyPI or ReversingLabs write-ups: n.a. | Detected because the malicious sdist/wheel did not match the project’s PyPI provenance attestations; cross-checked against Sigstore transparency logs (William Woodruff / Trail of Bits) (PyPI blog) | PyPI cites this as the first real-world case where PEP 740 attestations + Sigstore transparency logs produced the detection signal, reinforcing Trusted Publishing as the default path (PyPI blog) | PyPI blog, Socket, ReversingLabs |
| Same campaign, 2024 | GitHub Actions cache poisoning against angular/dev, mdn/content, hyperledger/besu and others | GitHub Actions | CI/build-pipeline compromise | Multiple high-profile repositories reachable through the same cache-poisoning primitive as Ultralytics (Socket) | Adnan Khan, offensive research into Actions cache behavior (Socket) | n.a. | Socket |
| Dec 19, 2024 | @rspack/core, @rspack/cli, vant | npm | Compromised maintainer/CI credential → XMRig cryptominer in a popular build tool | @rspack/core ~394,000 weekly downloads; @rspack/cli >145,000 weekly; vant ~46,000 weekly (Sonatype) | Sonatype automated malware detection, which blocked the versions before manual triage (Sonatype) | n.a. | Sonatype |
| Uploaded Nov 2021; disclosed Feb 4, 2025 | github.com/boltdb-go/bolt typosquat cached permanently by the Go Module Proxy | Go modules / proxy.golang.org | Lookalike/typosquatting + registry-caching persistence (backdoored clone pushed to GitHub, then git tags altered) | Undetected “3+ years”; the legitimate BoltDB has “8,367 other packages depending on it”; the Go Module Mirror “continued serving the cached malicious version for three years” (Socket, Socket mid-year report) | Socket Threat Research Team (Socket) | n.a. — Socket’s assessment is that “The Go registry is insufficient defense against both typosquatting and malicious packages” (Socket) | Socket |
| Reported Feb 10, 2025 (advisory issued Mar 26, 2026) | rands crate, typosquat of rand | crates.io | Lookalike/typosquatting, malicious code targeting “macOS and Linux hosts" | "The version information and download records of the malicious crate are no longer available” (RustSec) | Not stated on the advisory (RustSec) | “The related malicious crates have been yanked” and “the malicious account has been banned” (RustSec) | RustSec |
| Jan–Feb 2025 | Seven typosquatted Go modules impersonating areknoster/hypert and loov/layout | Go modules | Lookalike/typosquatting delivering an ELF malware loader on Linux/macOS | Seven malicious modules across four hypert and three layout typosquats, served through the “official Go Module Mirror” (Socket) | Socket Threat Research Team (Socket) | n.a. | Socket |
| Mar 14, 2025 | tj-actions/changed-files, CVE-2025-30066 — all tags repointed to a malicious commit | GitHub Actions | CI/build-pipeline compromise; secrets dumped into public build logs | ”actively used in over 23,000 public repositories”; “For nearly 24 hours, the compromised action remained available, actively leaking credentials from thousands of organizations” (StepSecurity, StepSecurity) | StepSecurity Harden-Runner behavioral/egress anomaly detection, not signature matching (StepSecurity) | GitHub removed the action at “2:00 PM UTC” the next day and restored a cleaned repository at “10:00 PM UTC” (StepSecurity); GitHub later shipped org/enterprise policy to block specific actions and require SHA pinning (GitHub changelog, Aug 15, 2025) | StepSecurity, StepSecurity/Black Hat, GitHub changelog |
| Mar 18, 2025 (compromise traced to the same operator) | reviewdog/action-setup@v1 and dependent composite actions, CVE-2025-30154 | GitHub Actions | CI/build-pipeline compromise — upstream link in the tj-actions chain | Confirmed compromised: action-setup, action-shellcheck, action-composite-template, action-staticcheck, action-ast-grep, action-typos; malicious commit f0d342d24037bb11d26b9bd8496e0808ba32e9ec (StepSecurity) | StepSecurity, investigating the tj-actions chain of compromises (StepSecurity) | Remediated as part of the same tj-actions response; StepSecurity states “The supply chain compromise of reviewdog GitHub Actions has been resolved” (StepSecurity) | StepSecurity |
Reported Mar 2025 (cross-fetch) and May 2025 (GraphQL-JS) | GitHub Actions workflow-injection paths into two npm packages | npm / GitHub Actions | CI/build-pipeline compromise (pre-exploitation; reported before abuse) | Combined “36M weekly installs” reachable through the two workflow-injection findings (Lupin & Holmes) | Independent security researchers via responsible disclosure (Lupin & Holmes) | n.a. | Lupin & Holmes |
| Apr 4, 2025 | Lazarus Group — 11 new malicious npm packages with malware loaders and Bitbucket-hosted payloads | npm | Nation-state/APT campaign (DPRK-attributed) | The 11 packages were “downloaded over 5,600 times” (Socket) | Socket Threat Research Team (Socket) | n.a. | Socket |
| May 24 and May 30, 2025 | fastlane-plugin-telegram-proxy, fastlane-plugin-proxy_teleram | RubyGems | Lookalike/typosquatting exploiting a policy moment (Vietnam’s Telegram ban) to exfiltrate bot tokens and messages | Two gems, published six days apart, targeting CI pipelines that use fastlane (Socket) | Socket Threat Research Team (Socket) | n.a. | Socket |
| First malicious publish Jun 6, 2025 21:33 GMT; reported Jun 8; disclosed Jun 9, 2025 | GlueStack / react-native-aria — 17 packages | npm | Compromised maintainer account → remote-access trojan in install path | 17 packages compromised, together “more than a million downloads a week” (Aikido, GlueStack) | Aikido Security intel pipeline reported it to the maintainers (GlueStack) | n.a. | Aikido, GlueStack |
| Removed from Open VSX Jul 2, 2025 | ”Solidity Language” malicious extension used inside Cursor IDE | Open VSX / Cursor | Malicious IDE/editor extension (Quasar RAT + PureLogs) | “$500K crypto theft” from a single victim (BleepingComputer) | Victim’s incident response; extension traced and removed (BleepingComputer) | Open VSX removed the extension (BleepingComputer) | BleepingComputer |
| Jul 15, 2025 (tracking update) | Protestware payload targeting Russian-language users spread across npm | npm | Protestware / intentional sabotage | ”at least 28 new packages with nearly 2,000 versions” carrying the same protestware script; individual peak download counts ranged from 156 (raffoom-poltergeist) to 1,822 (falcon-library-comp) (Socket) | Socket Threat Research Team, tracking script reuse across packages (Socket) | Socket tracks protestware as its own behavior class rather than as malware, following the payload script across packages (Socket). Earlier protestware waves (node-ipc, styled-components 5.3.4/5.3.5, es5-ext 0.10.54) established the pattern (Checkmarx) | Socket, Checkmarx |
| Jul 18, 2025 | eslint-config-prettier 8.10.1 / 9.1.1 / 10.1.6 / 10.1.7, plus eslint-plugin-prettier, snyckit, @pkgjs/core, napi-postinstall, is, got-fetch; CVE-2025-54313 | npm | Compromised maintainer account via phishing (maintainer JounQin confirmed) → Windows DLL payload in install script | Seven packages across one maintainer’s portfolio; is and napi-postinstall are widely-depended-upon utility packages (StepSecurity) | StepSecurity, from anomalous publish signals and diff review (StepSecurity) | n.a. at the time; npm’s later phishing-resistant-2FA and token-lifetime program is the ecosystem response to this class (GitHub) | StepSecurity |
| Jul 20, 2025 | Toptal GitHub organization hijack → 10 malicious @toptal/picasso-* and @xene/core npm packages | GitHub + npm | Compromised org account / PAT theft, with data-destructive payload | ”all 73 of the repositories” in the org were made public; malicious packages downloaded “roughly 5,000 times” from “17 unique IPs” (BleepingComputer) | Community/vendor observation of the sudden repo visibility change and package publishes (BleepingComputer) | n.a. | BleepingComputer |
| Aug 6, 2025 | 11 malicious Go modules distributing obfuscated remote payloads (linker, stm, gouid, mcp-go typosquats) | Go modules | Lookalike/typosquatting | 11 modules; several are “typosquats of each other” as well as of benign packages; only three projects had imported the original stm (Socket) | Socket Threat Research Team (Socket) | n.a. | Socket |
| Aug 26, 2025 | Nx “s1ngularity” — malicious nx and @nx/* versions | npm | CI/build-pipeline compromise → first widely-reported AI-assisted credential harvester (abused local Claude/Gemini CLIs) | Nx has “~6 million weekly installs”; malicious versions were live for a roughly 4-hour window (Nx post-mortem) | Detected because the published artifacts lacked npm provenance signing that legitimate Nx releases carry (Nx post-mortem) | Nx moved publishing to npm Trusted Publisher / OIDC; this is the incident npm and GitHub repeatedly cite when arguing for trusted publishing as the default (Nx post-mortem, GitHub) | Nx post-mortem, ReversingLabs |
| Sep 8, 2025, ~09:00 EST / first Aikido alert 13:16 UTC | Qix account compromise — debug, chalk, ansi-styles and 15+ more | npm | Compromised maintainer account via a phishing 2FA-reset email → browser crypto-clipper | Wiz reports the malicious versions were removed within hours (Wiz). Sources conflict on aggregate reach: Aikido says the affected packages have “more than 2 billion downloads per week” (Aikido), Socket says “These packages generally receive 2-3 billion downloads per week” (Socket). Per-package weekly downloads: ansi-styles 371.41m, debug 357.6m, chalk 299.99m, supports-color 287.1m, strip-ansi 261.17m, ansi-regex 243.64m, wrap-ansi 197.99m, color-convert 193.5m, color-name 191.71m (Aikido). ReversingLabs notes the attacker hit “five of the top 10 most widely used npm packages” (ReversingLabs) | Aikido’s automated npm intel feed alerted at 13:16 UTC on the anomalous versions (Aikido) | Fed directly into GitHub’s npm hardening roadmap: deprecate classic tokens, 7-day granular tokens, trusted publishing, and replacing TOTP with FIDO (GitHub). Amazon later attributed this compromise to North Korea’s Sapphire Sleet (The Hacker News) | Socket, Aikido, Wiz |
| Sep 13, 2025 | WhiteCobra — 24 crypto-stealing extensions flooded across Open VSX and VS Code Marketplace | VS Code Marketplace / Open VSX | Malicious IDE/editor extension | 24 extensions; contractshark.solidity-lang showed 54,000 downloads; Ethereum core developer Zak Cole had a wallet drained (BleepingComputer) | Victim disclosure plus marketplace research (BleepingComputer) | n.a. | BleepingComputer |
| Sep 14–16, 2025 | Shai-Hulud wave 1 — self-replicating npm worm, including CrowdStrike-scoped packages | npm | Cryptocurrency/credential-stealing worm (registry-native, self-propagating) | Socket enumerated 526 packages (Socket); CISA and GitHub both describe “over 500 packages” / “500+ compromised packages” (CISA, GitHub). ReversingLabs describes it as “the first ever registry-native worm malware” (ReversingLabs) | StepSecurity published the first 500+ package enumeration (Sep 15) and Socket the ongoing CrowdStrike-scope tracking (Sep 16); Unit 42 and ReversingLabs followed (CISA) | GitHub was notified Sep 14, 2025, removed “500+ compromised packages”, began blocking uploads matching known IoCs, and published a roadmap: local publish requiring 2FA, granular tokens with 7-day lifetime, trusted publishing, deprecation of classic tokens, and TOTP → FIDO (GitHub). CISA advised pinning to releases produced before Sep 16, 2025 (CISA) | Socket, CISA, GitHub, Wiz |
| Sep 23, 2025 (campaign ongoing) | pypi-mirror.org phishing campaign against PyPI maintainers | PyPI | Compromised-maintainer-account precursor: credential phishing via lookalike domain | PyPI did not publish a victim count; the post describes an ongoing wave of maintainer-targeted phishing (PyPI blog) | PyPI admins from maintainer reports and domain monitoring (PyPI blog) | PyPI pursued registrar takedowns, added domain blocklists, opened cross-registry collaboration channels, and pushed phishing-resistant 2FA (PyPI blog) | PyPI blog |
| Sep 24, 2025 | faster_log and async_println crates | crates.io | Lookalike/typosquatting (of fast_log / async_println style names) with crypto-wallet-stealing payload | faster_log: 7,181 downloads; async_println: 1,243 downloads; both deleted at 15:34 UTC on Sep 24, 2025 (Rust blog) | Reported by Kirill Boychenko of Socket to the Rust Security Response WG (Rust blog) | Crates deleted and accounts actioned by the Rust Security Response Team (Rust blog) | Rust blog |
| Attack began Oct 17, 2025; removals as of Oct 21, 2025 | GlassWorm — malicious VS Code / Open VSX extensions using invisible Unicode obfuscation and Solana-blockchain C2 | Open VSX / VS Code Marketplace | Malicious IDE/editor extension + worm-like credential theft | Sources conflict on scope. The Hacker News names 3 extensions with installs of 3,402 (ai-driven-dev.ai-driven-dev), 4,057 (adhamu.history-in-sublime-merge) and 2,431 (yasuyuky.transient-emacs) (The Hacker News); SecurityWeek reports “7 OpenVSX extensions compromised”, “10 still delivering malware” and “35,800+” installs (SecurityWeek). Targets 49 crypto-wallet extensions (The Hacker News) | First documented by Koi Security in late Oct 2025 (The Hacker News) | Open VSX removed all affected extensions and rotated publisher tokens as of Oct 21, 2025 (The Hacker News) | The Hacker News, SecurityWeek |
| Reported to NuGet Nov 5, 2025 (packages published 2023–2024) | shanhai666 NuGet packages including Sharp7Extend (typosquat of Sharp7) | NuGet | Lookalike/typosquatting + time-delayed destructive sabotage of industrial PLCs | 9 malicious of 12 packages by the author; payload waits “30–90 min” then causes “~80% silent PLC write failures” (Industrial Cyber) | Socket Threat Research Team (Industrial Cyber) | n.a. | Industrial Cyber |
| Nov 13, 2025 | IndonesianFoods — mass automated publication flood | npm | Registry spam/abuse tied to tea.xyz crypto reward farming (not credential theft) | Snyk counted roughly 5 distinct root packages (vointea/voinzaril plus -wekto/-riris/-z3n variants) and found “No confirmed downstream dependency compromise”, rating it low risk (Snyk); Sonatype’s 2026 report tallies the campaign at 169,538 npm packages (Sonatype) | Snyk security research and registry anomaly monitoring (Snyk) | n.a. | Snyk, Sonatype |
| First malicious publish Nov 24, 2025 04:11 UTC; Postman timeline starts Nov 23 16:03 PT | Shai-Hulud 2.0 / “The Second Coming” — AsyncAPI, PostHog, Postman, Zapier, ENS Domains scopes | npm (+ mirrored into Maven Central) | Cryptocurrency/credential-stealing worm, CI-propagated via GitHub Actions and stolen npm tokens | Counts diverge by source and by point in the wave: Aikido “492 packages” (Aikido); BleepingComputer cites Aikido’s list of “186 packages” early on and headlines “500 npm packages” (BleepingComputer); The Hacker News “More than 830 packages” (The Hacker News); ReversingLabs totals “more than 1,000 npm packages across two distinct campaigns” and “an estimated 25,000 GitHub repositories” (ReversingLabs). Secondary damage: “Over 28,000 repositories” affected, “More than 5,000 files” uploaded with exfiltrated secrets, and GitGuardian’s analysis of 4,645 repos found “11,858 unique secrets” of which “2,298 remained valid and publicly exposed” (The Hacker News). @ctrl/tinycolor ~2.2m weekly downloads and @asyncapi/specs ~1.4m weekly downloads (ReversingLabs). PostHog calls it “the largest and most impactful security incident we’ve ever had” and itself “patient zero” (PostHog); Postman had “17 public Postman NPM packages … hijacked” available “for about six hours” (Postman) | PostHog observed anomalous publishing at 04:11 UTC and identified malicious packages by 09:30 UTC (PostHog); Postman’s internal reports came in at 00:04:55 PT (Postman); Aikido enumerated the package list (Aikido); npm itself displayed “a warning message about unauthorized publication of the latest version, indicating that the automated review has caught signs of a compromise” (BleepingComputer) | npm disabled classic token creation in early November and revoked remaining classic tokens on Dec 9, and cut session token lifetime from 12h to 2h (Socket). Maven Central purged all mirrored copies of org.mvnpm:posthog-node:4.18.1 “As of November 25, 2025, 22:44 UTC” (The Hacker News). Postman restricted @postman publishing to OIDC-based Trusted Publishers only (Postman) | Aikido, PostHog, The Hacker News, Postman |
| Dec 8, 2025 | ”Bitcoin Black” and “Codo AI” extensions by publisher “BigBlack” | VS Code Marketplace | Malicious IDE/editor extension (DLL-hijack infostealer via Lightshot) | “Bitcoin Black’s counter showed only one install”; “Codo AI … counted fewer than 30 downloads” and “was still present in the marketplace” at publication (BleepingComputer) | Security researchers reviewing marketplace listings; flagged the "*" activation event and PowerShell execution in a “color theme” (BleepingComputer) | n.a. | BleepingComputer |
| Dec 16, 2025 | Tracer.Fody.NLog impersonating Tracer.Fody | NuGet | Lookalike/typosquatting with maintainer-name spoofing (csnemes vs csnemess) and Cyrillic lookalike characters | Package “remained on the repository for nearly six years” and “has been downloaded at least 2,000 times”, of which “19 took place over the last six weeks” (The Hacker News) | Socket researcher Kirill Boychenko (The Hacker News) | n.a. | The Hacker News |
| Disclosed ~Dec 30, 2025 – Jan 2, 2026 | Malicious org.fasterxml.jackson.core package impersonating the Jackson JSON library | Maven Central | Lookalike/typosquatting → trojan downloader delivering Cobalt Strike beacons | ”taken down within an hour and a half of its disclosure” (SC Media) | Aikido researchers (SC Media) | Aikido’s stated recommendation: “Such findings should prompt the adoption of prefix-similarity namespace detection in Maven Central” (SC Media) | SC Media |
| Flagged Jan 20–21, 2026 | spellcheckpy and spellcheckerpy impersonating pyspellchecker | PyPI | Lookalike/typosquatting delivering a Python RAT | Two packages; follows an earlier spellcheckers campaign documented by HelixGuard in Nov 2025 (Aikido) | Aikido automated malware feed (Aikido) | n.a. | Aikido |
| Feb 12, 2026 (campaign active since May 2025; “XPACK ATTACK” first recorded Feb 4, 2026) | Lazarus graphalgo campaign across npm and PyPI, with fake recruiter front company “Veltrix Capital” | npm + PyPI | Nation-state/APT campaign (DPRK) with social-engineering delivery; duer-js / Bada Stealer payloads | Campaign spans npm and PyPI and has been “active since May 2025” (The Hacker News) | Vendor threat-intelligence tracking of DPRK developer-targeting clusters (The Hacker News) | n.a. | The Hacker News |
| First version published ~Feb 16, 2026; campaign traced to Dec 2025 | StripeApi.Net impersonating Stripe.net | NuGet | Lookalike/typosquatting; steals the Stripe API token when StripeClient is initialized | Part of “a malicious NuGet campaign that targeted developers and packages linked to cryptocurrency platforms such as Coinbase, Binance, Solana and Nethereum”; listing mirrored the official page, links, and tags (ReversingLabs) | ReversingLabs research team (ReversingLabs) | n.a. | ReversingLabs |
| Feb 20, 2026 | SANDWORM_MODE npm worm that poisons AI coding-assistant configuration | npm + AI toolchain | Cryptocurrency/credential worm + AI toolchain poisoning; propagates via a GitHub Action | 19 malicious npm packages plus 4 dormant “sleepers”; poisons Claude, Cursor, Continue and Windsurf MCP configs; propagates through ci-quality/code-quality-check GitHub Actions (Socket) | Socket Threat Research Team (Socket) | Named by Sonatype as one of the defining Q1 2026 campaigns under its “Trust Abuse, Not Novelty” theme (Sonatype Q1 2026 Index) | Socket |
| Mar 3, 2026 | angular/dev-infra GitHub Actions cache poisoning → ANGULAR_ROBOT_PRIVATE_KEY | GitHub Actions | CI/build-pipeline compromise; demonstrated path to compromising the flagship Angular repository | Researcher demonstrated a chain from a shared dev-infra workflow to write access on Angular’s main repository; reported via Google’s OSS VRP (Adnan Khan) | Adnan Khan, offensive CI research, responsibly disclosed (Adnan Khan) | n.a. | Adnan Khan |
Mar 24, 2026 (litellm), Mar 27, 2026 (telnyx) | “TeamPCP” cross-ecosystem campaign — litellm 1.82.7/1.82.8, telnyx, aquasec/trivy Docker images, aquasecurity/setup-trivy and trivy-action GitHub Actions, Checkmarx kics/ast Actions, Open VSX ast-results and cx-dev-assist, plus numerous npm packages | PyPI + npm + GitHub Actions + Open VSX + container registries | CI/build-pipeline compromise spanning five distribution channels from a single operator | The campaign reached security-tooling distribution channels (Trivy, Checkmarx) used inside other organizations’ pipelines (Datadog Security Labs) | Datadog Security Labs (Datadog Security Labs) | Named by Sonatype in its Q1 2026 index as a defining trust-abuse campaign (Sonatype Q1 2026 Index) | Datadog Security Labs |
| Mar 31, 2026 | axios 1.14.1 and 0.30.4, plus plain-crypto-js@4.2.1 | npm | Compromised maintainer account (jasonsaayman); attacker bypassed OIDC trusted publishing by using a long-lived token | First infection occurred 89 seconds after publish; Socket flagged the malware ~6 minutes after publish (Huntress) | Socket’s automated scanner, ~6 minutes post-publish (Huntress) | Cited by Sonatype’s Q1 2026 index as evidence that attackers now abuse trust primitives rather than invent new techniques (Sonatype Q1 2026 Index). Amazon later attributed it to Sapphire Sleet (North Korea) (The Hacker News) | Huntress |
| Extensions published early Apr 2026; disclosed Apr 28, 2026 | 73 cloned VS Code extensions (“GlassWorm v2”) | VS Code Marketplace / Open VSX | Malicious IDE/editor extension — cloned “sleeper” packages plus typosquatting; Zig-based droppers | ”a cluster of 73 extensions”; “Of these, six have been confirmed to be malicious”; payload installs “into every IDE identified in the system” (VS Code, Cursor, Windsurf, VSCodium); “more than 320 artifacts have been identified since December 21, 2025” (The Hacker News) | Socket Threat Research Team (The Hacker News) | n.a. | The Hacker News |
| Apr 30, 2026 | ”Mini Shai-Hulud” hits SAP CAP — @cap-js/sqlite v2.2.2, @cap-js/postgres v2.2.2, @cap-js/db-service v2.10.1, mbt v1.2.48 | npm | Cryptocurrency/credential worm variant; entry via the cloudmtabot automation token | Four packages central to SAP CAP / BTP application builds (SecurityBridge) | SecurityBridge research on SAP-adjacent npm dependencies (SecurityBridge) | n.a. | SecurityBridge |
| May 11–12, 2026 (48-hour window) | “Mini Shai-Hulud” largest wave — @tanstack, @uipath, @squawk, @tallyui, @mistralai, @opensearch-project, @draftlab, @mesadev | npm + PyPI | Cryptocurrency/credential worm; published under a valid GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher identity | ”172 unique packages” across “403 malicious versions”: @uipath 66, @tanstack 42, @squawk 22, @tallyui 10, @mistralai 3; malicious versions appeared under the legitimate GitHub Actions / <npm-oidc-no-reply@github.com> publisher identity in npm metadata (Mend) | Mend research; traced the attack to a malicious draft PR opened at 10:49 UTC that ran four Bundle Size workflow runs between 10:49 and 11:11 UTC (Mend) | Directly motivated the minimumReleaseAge / release-age gating family of controls now shipped by npm, pnpm, Yarn and Bun (Socket) | Mend |
| May 28, 2026 | 14 typosquatted npm packages by maintainer vpmdhaj, impersonating OpenSearch and Elastic packages | npm | Lookalike/typosquatting aimed at cloud CI/CD secrets | 14 packages (Microsoft) | Microsoft Threat Intelligence (Microsoft) | n.a. | Microsoft |
| May 29, 2026 | 33 malicious npm packages abusing dependency confusion to profile developer environments | npm | Dependency confusion / namespace confusion (reconnaissance stage) | 33 packages across 9 organization scopes (Microsoft) | Microsoft Threat Intelligence (Microsoft) | n.a. | Microsoft |
| Jun 7, 2026 | Shai-Hulud copycat on PyPI — rlask, tlask, rsquests, nhmpy, mflux-streamlit | PyPI | Lookalike/typosquatting + worm-style credential theft (copycat of Shai-Hulud) | 5 PyPI packages; GitLab “flagged the first malicious version within 28 seconds” of publication (GitLab) | GitLab Vulnerability Research, automated package-publication monitoring (GitLab) | n.a. | GitLab |
| Jun 9, 2026 | ”Hades” wave of the Miasma campaign | PyPI | AI-toolchain-targeting malicious wheels; part of a broader multi-ecosystem worm campaign | ”37 malicious wheel artifacts across 19 PyPI packages”; targets 11 AI assistants/IDEs (The Hacker News) | Security research on the Miasma campaign cluster (The Hacker News) | n.a. | The Hacker News |
| Attribution published Jul 30, 2026 | Amazon attributes debug/chalk (Sep 2025) and axios (Mar 2026) to North Korea’s Sapphire Sleet | npm | Nation-state/APT campaign re-classification of two earlier maintainer-account compromises | Also ties typo-crypto@4.3.0 (trojanized Mar 2025) and, per Aikido, the Mastra compromise, to the same actor (The Hacker News) | Amazon threat intelligence (The Hacker News) | n.a. | The Hacker News |
| Aug 4, 2026 | ChainDrop — self-propagating npm worm through keyv, flat-cache, cache-manager, cacheable-request | npm | Cryptocurrency/credential worm; abuses GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publishers so malicious packages carry valid provenance | Microsoft: “more than 400 packages”, described as a “Mini Shai-Hulud variant” (Microsoft). Elastic: “over 400 unique npm packages” with “over 1.3 billion monthly downloads”; keyv “over 600 million downloads last month”, flat-cache “near 580 million”, cacheable-request “over 137 million”; up to 50 branches per repo; 300+ credential patterns; 711 KB payload run under Bun v1.3.13 (Elastic Security Labs) | Microsoft Security and Elastic Security Labs (Microsoft, Elastic) | Occurred after npm 12 began disabling install scripts by default; the worm’s use of valid OIDC provenance is the clearest evidence that trusted publishing alone does not stop CI-resident worms (The Hacker News, Microsoft) | Microsoft, Elastic Security Labs |
| Aug 15–20, 2026 | Cross-ecosystem typosquat flood: 16 RubyGems packages, 37 npm packages, +3 more | RubyGems + npm | Lookalike/typosquatting with a 22 MB Rust-based loader | 16 RubyGems typosquats discovered Aug 15, 2026; 37 npm typosquats Aug 16, 2026; 3 additional found by CloudSEK on Aug 20, 2026 (The Hacker News) | OpenSourceMalware (RubyGems and npm sets) and CloudSEK (additional packages) (The Hacker News) | n.a. | The Hacker News |
| Aug 20, 2026 | arrayref@0.3.10, internment@0.8.7, append-only-vec@0.1.9 (maintainer droundy), pulling in proc-macro1@1.0.107 | crates.io | Compromised maintainer account + typosquatting of proc-macro2, with build-time code execution | RustSec noted “~152 million downloads” for the prior clean release of the affected crate line; Socket’s AI Scanner detected it at 07:29:50 UTC on Aug 20, 2026 (Socket) | Socket AI Scanner, automated detection at publish time (Socket) | Rust Security Response Team removed the releases, locked the maintainer account, and also removed proc-macro-en, aovine, arone, aronenao, tinymember (Socket) | Socket |
| Research published Apr 2025 (ongoing risk class) | Slopsquatting — package names hallucinated by LLMs, then registered by attackers | npm + PyPI | AI slopsquatting / name hallucination | Across 16 models and 576,000 code samples, 19.7% of recommended packages did not exist; open-source models hallucinated at 21.7% vs 5.2% for commercial models; 38% of hallucinated names showed moderate string similarity to real packages; 8.7% of Python hallucinations were valid npm names (Socket). Sonatype separately measured GPT-5 hallucinating “27.8%” of component versions across 37,000 recommendations (Sonatype) | Academic/industry measurement study surfaced by Socket (Socket) | Socket’s 2025 mid-year report also documents Google AI Overview echoing a legitimate README to lend “an undeserved appearance of credibility” to the malicious @async-mutex/mutex (Socket) | Socket, Socket mid-year 2025 |
Row count: 47 incidents/campaigns.
Section 2 — Category ranking by reported impact
Impact here is a qualitative synthesis of reported downloads affected, financial loss, and secondary victims (repos, secrets, downstream orgs).
| Rank | Category | Representative incidents | Justification |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Cryptocurrency-stealing / credential-stealing worm (Shai-Hulud class) | Shai-Hulud wave 1 (526 packages), Shai-Hulud 2.0 (492–830+ packages), Mini Shai-Hulud SAP CAP and TanStack/UiPath waves, ChainDrop, SANDWORM_MODE | Largest blast radius by every measured axis. ReversingLabs totals “more than 1,000 npm packages across two distinct campaigns” and “an estimated 25,000 GitHub repositories” (ReversingLabs); The Hacker News reports “Over 28,000 repositories” affected and GitGuardian finding “11,858 unique secrets” of which “2,298 remained valid and publicly exposed” (The Hacker News). ChainDrop alone touched packages with “over 1.3 billion monthly downloads” (Elastic). Uniquely, the harm is secondary — stolen cloud, npm and GitHub credentials that outlive the package takedown. |
| 2 | Compromised maintainer account → malicious version of a very popular package | Qix debug/chalk, axios, @solana/web3.js, lottie-player, eslint-config-prettier, @rspack/core, crates.io arrayref/internment | Highest per-incident download exposure. The Qix compromise hit packages at “more than 2 billion downloads per week” (Aikido) / “2-3 billion downloads per week” (Socket), including “five of the top 10 most widely used npm packages” (ReversingLabs). Directly measurable financial loss: “over 723,000" from Lottie Player ([Sonatype](https://www.sonatype.com/blog/npm-packages-rspack-vant-compromised-blocked-by-sonatype)) and "roughly 130K” from @solana/web3.js (Socket). RubyGems’ own trusted-publishing announcement calls account takeovers “the second most common software supply chain attack” (RubyGems). |
| 3 | CI/build-pipeline compromise | tj-actions/changed-files, reviewdog, Ultralytics (Actions cache poisoning), Nx s1ngularity, TeamPCP, angular/dev-infra, cross-fetch/GraphQL-JS | Attacks the trust root rather than a single package. tj-actions was “actively used in over 23,000 public repositories” and leaked credentials from “thousands of organizations” for nearly 24 hours (StepSecurity); Nx has “~6 million weekly installs” (Nx); TeamPCP reached five distribution channels including security tooling used inside other pipelines (Datadog). CI compromise is also the delivery mechanism for most rank-1 worm waves (Mend, PostHog). |
| 4 | Lookalike / typosquatting | boltdb-go/bolt, hypert/layout Go modules, Sharp7Extend, Tracer.Fody.NLog, StripeApi.Net, faster_log, Jackson on Maven, 16 RubyGems + 37 npm packages, scribejava-core | Highest volume category and the one that persists longest. boltdb-go/bolt went “undetected 3+ years” against a library with “8,367 other packages depending on it” (Socket); Tracer.Fody.NLog sat on NuGet “for nearly six years” (The Hacker News). Per-incident downloads are usually small (thousands), but Sonatype’s Q1 2026 index puts npm at “46 malicious packages per day” (Sonatype Q1 2026). |
| 5 | Nation-state / APT campaign | Lazarus npm packages (Apr 2025), graphalgo campaign, Sapphire Sleet attribution of debug/chalk and axios, XZ Utils | Sonatype frames a whole report chapter as “Open Source Malware is a Nation-State Business Model” (Sonatype) and counts “more than 800 Lazarus-associated packages”, 97% of them on npm (Sonatype). Direct download counts are modest (“downloaded over 5,600 times” for the Apr 2025 set, Socket), but the same actor is now credited with the two largest maintainer-account compromises of the period (The Hacker News). XZ Utils showed a ~2-year social-engineering runway reaching Fedora, Ubuntu and Debian (Akamai). |
| 6 | Malicious IDE/editor extension | GlassWorm (Open VSX), GlassWorm v2 (73 cloned extensions), WhiteCobra (24 extensions), “Solidity Language” in Cursor, Bitcoin Black / Codo AI | Small install counts, outsized per-victim loss: “$500K crypto theft” from one Cursor user (BleepingComputer); GlassWorm targets 49 crypto-wallet extensions (The Hacker News); GlassWorm v2 installs its payload “into every IDE identified in the system” (The Hacker News). ReversingLabs found a marketplace loophole letting an attacker “reuse the name of a legitimate but discontinued VS Code extension” (ReversingLabs). |
| 7 | Install-time / build-time script abuse | Sharp7Extend PLC sabotage, eslint-config-prettier (DLL via install script), napi-postinstall, crates.io proc-macro1 (build-time), most worm payloads’ preinstall stage | Not usually the initiating flaw, but the execution surface that turns a bad version into code execution. GitHub called lifecycle hooks “the single largest code-execution surface in the npm ecosystem” when announcing their default disablement (The Hacker News). Shai-Hulud 2.0’s payload “executes only during the pre-install stage” (BleepingComputer). The crates.io August 2026 case shows the same problem at build time rather than install time (Socket). |
| 8 | AI slopsquatting / name hallucination | Slopsquatting research; @async-mutex/mutex amplified by Google AI Overview | Very large measured potential surface — “19.7% of recommended packages did not exist” across 576,000 samples (Socket), and GPT-5 hallucinating “27.8%” of component versions (Sonatype) — but I found no fetched source attributing a specific large-scale breach in this window solely to slopsquatting. Ranked on exposure, not realized loss. |
| 9 | Repo-jacking / abandoned-namespace takeover | MavenGate (Jan 2024), Checkmarx abandoned-assets research (CocoaPods, bignum S3 bucket, ctx, PHPass, gemnasium-gitlab-service) | Extremely broad theoretical reach — projects tied to “Google, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, Adobe, LinkedIn, Netflix, and over two hundred other companies” (Checkmarx) — but the in-window evidence I could fetch is research and disclosure rather than exploited incidents with measured victims. |
| 10 | Dependency confusion / namespace confusion | 33 malicious npm packages (May 2026) | The only in-window dependency-confusion campaign I could confirm from a primary source is a 33-package reconnaissance effort across 9 org scopes, with no reported downstream compromise (Microsoft). ReversingLabs still lists dependency confusion among current attack techniques (ReversingLabs). |
| 11 | Protestware / intentional sabotage | 28 npm packages with Russian-locale payload (Jul 2025); historical node-ipc, styled-components, es5-ext | Broad but shallow: “at least 28 new packages with nearly 2,000 versions”, with peak downloads per package between 156 and 1,822 (Socket). No measured financial loss in-window. The destructive variants (node-ipc wiper) predate this window (Checkmarx). The industrial-PLC NuGet sabotage is arguably the most destructive intentional-harm case of the period, but reporters classify it as typosquatting malware rather than protestware (Industrial Cyber). |
| 12 | Registry spam / reward-farming flood | IndonesianFoods | Enormous package count — Sonatype tallies 169,538 npm packages (Sonatype) — but Snyk found “No confirmed downstream dependency compromise” and rated it low risk (Snyk). Included because it distorts every “malicious package count” statistic and consumes registry capacity. |
Section 3 — Trend over the period (2024 → 2025 → 2026-YTD)
| Category | 2024 | 2025 | 2026-YTD | Direction | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall malicious-package volume | baseline | ”more than 454,600 new malicious packages” in 2025; cumulative “over 1.233 million” since 2017 | ”21,764 malicious open source packages” in Q1 2026; cumulative “1,346,867” | Increasing | Sonatype reports “Open Source Malware Grows 75%” year over year (Sonatype, Sonatype 2026, Sonatype Q1 2026) |
| npm share of malicious packages | 98.5% of all open-source malware was on npmjs.com | npm “more than doubled”, “accounting for nearly 90% of all the open-source malware detected”; ReversingLabs counts “10,819” malicious npm packages, a “more than 100% increase” | npm is “75% of new malware” = “46 malicious packages per day” | Flat-to-decreasing as a share, increasing in absolute terms | Sonatype’s 2024 figure of “98.5%” (Sonatype) vs. ReversingLabs 2025 “nearly 90%” (ReversingLabs, ReversingLabs takeaways) vs. Sonatype Q1 2026 “75%” with PyPI at 18% (Sonatype Q1 2026) |
| Self-propagating worms (Shai-Hulud class) | none reported | first ever: Shai-Hulud (Sep 2025), then Shai-Hulud 2.0 (Nov 2025) | continuous: SANDWORM_MODE (Feb), Mini Shai-Hulud SAP (Apr), Mini Shai-Hulud 172-package wave (May), copycat on PyPI (Jun), ChainDrop (Aug) | Sharply increasing | ReversingLabs calls Shai-Hulud “the first ever registry-native worm malware”, “first detected in September” 2025 (ReversingLabs); 2026 waves documented by Socket, SecurityBridge, Mend, GitLab, Microsoft |
| Compromised maintainer accounts | lottie-player, @solana/web3.js, @rspack/core | eslint-config-prettier, Qix (debug/chalk), Toptal, GlueStack, Shai-Hulud propagation | axios, crates.io droundy crates; now attributed to a state actor | Flat in count, increasing in severity | RubyGems calls account takeovers “the second most common software supply chain attack” (RubyGems); Sonatype’s Q1 2026 theme is “Trust Abuse, Not Novelty”, naming axios (Sonatype Q1 2026) |
| CI/build-pipeline compromise | Ultralytics Actions cache poisoning | tj-actions, reviewdog, Nx s1ngularity, cross-fetch/GraphQL-JS | angular/dev-infra, TeamPCP, and CI as the propagation vector for every 2026 worm wave | Increasing | ReversingLabs lists “GitHub Action manipulation” among the techniques driving the 2025–2026 rise (ReversingLabs); Datadog, Adnan Khan |
| Typosquatting | scribejava-core (Maven), Go module proxy caching | hypert/layout, faster_log, Sharp7Extend, Tracer.Fody.NLog, fastlane gems | Jackson (Maven), spellcheckpy, StripeApi.Net, 14 npm OpenSearch/Elastic squats, 16 RubyGems + 37 npm | Increasing and spreading beyond npm/PyPI | Socket’s mid-year 2025 report documents typosquatting across npm, PyPI, RubyGems and Go (Socket); 2026 spread to NuGet, Maven and RubyGems (ReversingLabs, SC Media, The Hacker News) |
| Nation-state / APT | XZ Utils | Lazarus npm packages, “more than 800 Lazarus-associated packages” (97% npm) | graphalgo campaign; Sapphire Sleet attribution of two flagship npm compromises | Increasing | Sonatype titles a 2026 chapter “Open Source Malware is a Nation-State Business Model” (Sonatype, Sonatype); The Hacker News |
| Malicious IDE/editor extensions | n.a. (no in-window 2024 incident found) | “Solidity Language” ($500K), WhiteCobra (24), GlassWorm (Open VSX) | GlassWorm v2 (73 cloned extensions), Bitcoin Black / Codo AI | Increasing | ReversingLabs “discovered several malicious campaigns on VS Code Marketplace in 2025” (ReversingLabs); Sonatype’s 2026 table lists OpenVSX+VSCode incident counts of 12, then 3, then 24 (Sonatype); The Hacker News |
| AI-related risk (slopsquatting, AI-toolchain poisoning, AI-assisted payloads) | n.a. | Nx s1ngularity abused local AI CLIs; slopsquatting measured at 19.7% | SANDWORM_MODE poisons MCP configs; Hades targets 11 AI assistants; GPT-5 version-hallucination at 27.8% | Sharply increasing | Sonatype: “AI Accelerates Both Productivity and Security Risk” (Sonatype, Sonatype); ReversingLabs report covers “attacks on Generative AI Supply Chains” including Hugging Face Pickle abuse and the first malicious MCP server (postmark-mcp) on npm (ReversingLabs); Socket, The Hacker News |
| Detection latency | Malware “used to sit there for months” | PyPI: “66% handled <4h, 92% <24h”; Socket flagged axios in ~6 min | GitLab flagged a malicious PyPI version “within 28 seconds”; Socket AI Scanner caught crates.io compromise at publish time | Improving sharply | Socket on PyPI: “Malware that used to sit there for months is now removed in just hours and oftentimes minutes from publication” (Socket); PyPI’s own 2025 review (PyPI); GitLab; Huntress; Socket |
| Protestware | historical (node-ipc, styled-components, es5-ext) | 28 npm packages tracked | no new campaign found in fetched sources | Flat-to-decreasing | Socket, Checkmarx |
| Registry scale / infrastructure strain (context for any new registry design) | — | PyPI: “>3.9M new files”, “>130,000 new projects”, “1.92 exabytes”, “2.56 trillion requests” | Sonatype: “9.8T downloads up 67% YoY” | Increasing | PyPI 2025 in review, Sonatype |
Section 4 — Defenses with evidence they reduced repeat incidents
Each item: what it is, who adopted it, what it responded to, and what the evidence actually shows. I separate adoption evidence (widely available) from effectiveness evidence (much rarer) because the distinction matters for design decisions.
-
Mandatory 2FA (and the move to phishing-resistant factors)
- Adopted by: PyPI required 2FA for “all users” from January 1, 2024, after starting with “the top 1% of projects by downloads” and distributing “4,000 hardware keys” (PyPI). npm scoped its requirement to the “top 100 by dependents”, then the “top 500”, and then to “high-impact packages at a million weekly downloads or 500 dependents” (Nesbitt). RubyGems requires it for “owners of any gem with more than 180 million total downloads” (Nesbitt).
- Responded to: the maintainer-account-takeover class generally.
- Evidence: adoption is real and measurable — PyPI reports “>52% active users with non-phishable 2FA” (PyPI), up from “~80% of all users that have logged in since January 2024 have 2FA enabled” of any kind (Socket). But TOTP-based 2FA demonstrably did not stop repeats. Lottie Player was taken over “with 2FA enabled” because a long-lived automation token could publish (Checkmarx), and the Qix compromise came from a phishing email that reset 2FA (Socket). This is precisely why GitHub’s post-Shai-Hulud plan deprecates TOTP in favor of FIDO (GitHub) and PyPI pushes “phishing-resistant 2FA” (PyPI).
- Design takeaway for a new registry: make WebAuthn the only second factor, and do not ship a token type that can publish without it.
-
Trusted publishing / OIDC (short-lived, workflow-scoped credentials instead of long-lived tokens)
- Adopted by: PyPI launched it April 20, 2023 (PyPI); RubyGems December 14, 2023 (RubyGems); npm reached GA July 31, 2025 for GitHub Actions and GitLab CI, with provenance attestations on by default (GitHub); crates.io launched it in 2025, and pub.dev also adopted it (Socket).
- Responded to: the maintainer-token theft class — Lottie Player,
eslint-config-prettier, Qix, Nx. - Evidence: strong adoption numbers — PyPI reports “>50,000 projects using trusted publishing” and “>20% of uploads via trusted publishers” (PyPI); crates.io reported “more than 189,000 crates” as of July 2025 (Socket). npm hard-cut the alternative: it “disabled classic token creation in early November” and “revoked remaining classic tokens” on December 9, and cut session token lifetime from 12h to 2h (Socket).
- Explicit limits, which are the most important finding in this section. Trusted publishing did not stop the 2026 worms. The May 2026 Mini Shai-Hulud wave’s malicious versions “appeared under the legitimate
GitHub Actions/<npm-oidc-no-reply@github.com>publisher identity in npm metadata” (Mend); ChainDrop “abuses GHA OIDC trusted publishers so packages carry valid provenance” (Microsoft); and theaxiosattacker “bypassed OIDC using a long-lived token” that still existed on the account (Huntress). OIDC moves the attack from the maintainer’s laptop to the maintainer’s CI, and CI is now where the attacks are.
-
Sigstore signing, provenance attestations, and transparency logs
- Adopted by: PyPI shipped PEP 740 attestations to GA on November 14, 2024, implemented jointly by “the Google Open Source Security Team” and “Trail of Bits”, with default enablement for projects using Trusted Publishing and the canonical GitHub Action (Sigstore). npm attaches provenance attestations automatically for trusted-publishing releases (GitHub).
- Responded to: Ultralytics — and this is the one case with clean causal detection evidence.
- Evidence of effect: the Ultralytics compromise was caught because the malicious artifacts did not match the project’s attestations, cross-checked against Sigstore transparency logs (PyPI). Nx s1ngularity was likewise detected via missing npm provenance signing on the malicious versions (Nx). Adoption is climbing: “over 20,000 individual attestations” and “just over 5% of the top 360 projects” at GA (Sigstore), rising to “86 of the top 360 most-downloaded packages on PyPI … uploaded with attestations”, “up 309% from 21 in November 2024” (Socket), and PyPI reporting 17% of uploads carrying an attestation (PyPI).
- Caveat: provenance proves where a build ran, not that the build was clean — see ChainDrop above.
-
Quarantine / hold windows / minimum release age
- Adopted by: PyPI introduced a non-destructive Quarantine project state, with “~140 projects quarantined since Aug 2024” and “only 1 exited” quarantine (PyPI). Client-side release-age gating shipped across the JS ecosystem: pnpm
minimumReleaseAgein v10.16 (Sep 2025), YarnnpmMinimalAgeGatein 4.10.0 (mid-Sep 2025), Bun in v1.3 (Oct 2025), and npm CLI 11.10.0minimumReleaseAgeon February 26, 2026 (Socket). npm also moved to staged publishing (Socket). - Responded to: the fast-moving worm waves, where the damage window is minutes to hours.
- Evidence of effect: the timing data makes the case arithmetically rather than by vendor claim.
axios’s first infection was 89 seconds after publish and detection came at ~6 minutes (Huntress); Postman’s hijacked packages were live “for about six hours” (Postman); PostHog’s window was 4:11→9:30 UTC (PostHog). PostHog’s own recommendation after the incident is “a 3 day” package delay (PostHog). Every one of these would have been absorbed by a multi-day age gate. I found no vendor publishing a measured reduction-in-incidents figure for release-age gating, so treat this as strong mechanism evidence rather than proven outcome evidence.
- Adopted by: PyPI introduced a non-destructive Quarantine project state, with “~140 projects quarantined since Aug 2024” and “only 1 exited” quarantine (PyPI). Client-side release-age gating shipped across the JS ecosystem: pnpm
-
Immutable SHA pinning and allow-listed actions
- Adopted by: GitHub shipped organization/enterprise policy to block specific actions and to require SHA pinning on August 15, 2025 — “preventing potential malicious updates to existing tags” and giving pipelines “trusted, unalterable assets” (GitHub).
- Responded to: tj-actions/changed-files and reviewdog, where mutable tags were repointed to a malicious commit (StepSecurity, StepSecurity).
- Evidence of effect: the mechanism directly neutralizes the tag-repointing primitive, and CISA’s guidance in the same period was to pin to known-safe releases (CISA). However, SHA pinning did not prevent the 2026 Actions-based attacks, which compromised the build environment itself rather than the action reference — angular/dev-infra via cache poisoning (Adnan Khan) and TeamPCP via compromised action repositories (Datadog). No vendor-published repeat-reduction metric found.
-
Removing or sandboxing install-time scripts
- Adopted by: GitHub announced on June 11, 2026 that npm would disable install scripts by default, calling lifecycle hooks “the single largest code-execution surface in the npm ecosystem” (The Hacker News). npm 12 disables
preinstall,install,postinstalland implicitnode-gypby default, with an opt-intrusted-scriptallowlist inpackage.json; npm v12 also defaults to--allow-git=none(The Hacker News, Socket). - Responded to: Shai-Hulud, whose payload “executes only during the pre-install stage” (BleepingComputer), and
eslint-config-prettier’s install-script DLL drop (StepSecurity). - Evidence of effect: too recent to show a measured reduction, and ChainDrop landed in August 2026 after the change (Microsoft), executing in CI rather than at install. The crates.io August 2026 compromise is a reminder that removing install scripts leaves build scripts (
build.rs, proc macros) as an equivalent surface (Socket), as does Java’s ability to execute compiled jars during builds. - Design takeaway: a new language should treat install-time and build-time execution as one surface and default both to off.
- Adopted by: GitHub announced on June 11, 2026 that npm would disable install scripts by default, calling lifecycle hooks “the single largest code-execution surface in the npm ecosystem” (The Hacker News). npm 12 disables
-
Namespace / repo-jacking and domain-resurrection protections
- Adopted by: PyPI implemented Domain Resurrection Prevention (PyPI) and denied the
aiocpaattacker’s attempt to take over an existing project name (PyPI). - Responded to: the abandoned-asset class documented by Checkmarx — MavenGate, expired maintainer email domains behind
ctxandPHPass, abandoned S3 buckets behindbignum, and abandoned gem names likegemnasium-gitlab-service(Checkmarx). - Evidence of effect: partially ruled out. PyPI’s control addresses the email-domain resurrection vector specifically, and I found no vendor claim quantifying reduced repo-jacking. Maven Central has no equivalent control that I could confirm; Aikido’s recommendation after the Jackson typosquat was that Maven Central should adopt “prefix-similarity namespace detection”, implying it does not (SC Media). ReversingLabs also documented a VS Code Marketplace loophole permitting reuse of “the name of a legitimate but discontinued VS Code extension” (ReversingLabs).
- Adopted by: PyPI implemented Domain Resurrection Prevention (PyPI) and denied the
-
Typosquat name blocking at creation time
- Adopted by: PyPI added typosquatting detection at project creation (PyPI).
- Responded to: the long tail of lookalike packages across every registry.
- Evidence of effect: not demonstrated. PyPI publishes the control but no reduction metric, and typosquats continued through 2026 on PyPI (
spellcheckpy), NuGet, Maven Central, RubyGems and Go (Aikido, ReversingLabs, SC Media, The Hacker News). Socket’s assessment of Go is blunt: “The Go registry is insufficient defense against both typosquatting and malicious packages” (Socket). Note also that name-similarity checks miss maintainer-name spoofing (csnemesvscsnemess) and Cyrillic homoglyphs (The Hacker News).
-
Slopsquatting-specific detection tooling
- Evidence: explicitly ruled out for this period. I found no registry-level control specifically targeting AI-hallucinated package names. The measurement work exists — 19.7% nonexistent recommended packages across 576,000 samples (Socket), GPT-5 at “27.8%” version hallucination across 37,000 recommendations (Sonatype) — but the mitigations described are scanner-side, not registry-side. Sonatype frames it under “Synthetic Growth is Not the Same as Innovation” and “non-existent versions” (Sonatype).
-
Extension marketplace review changes
- Adopted by: Open VSX removed all GlassWorm extensions and rotated publisher tokens as of October 21, 2025 (The Hacker News).
- Evidence of effect: largely ruled out. The token rotation was incident response, not a review-process change, and malicious extensions continued to appear on both marketplaces afterwards — Bitcoin Black and Codo AI were still live on Microsoft’s registry in December 2025 (BleepingComputer), and 73 cloned extensions surfaced in April 2026 with “more than 320 artifacts … identified since December 21, 2025” (The Hacker News). Sonatype’s incident table shows extension-marketplace counts rising rather than falling (Sonatype).
-
Fast malware triage as a first-class registry function
- Adopted by: PyPI hired a dedicated Safety & Security Engineer and rebuilt its reporting pipeline. Results: “Approximately 900 projects were removed since mid-March 2024”, and “Malware that used to sit there for months is now removed in just hours and oftentimes minutes from publication” (Socket). By 2025: “>2000 malware reports”, “66% handled <4h”, “92% <24h” (PyPI).
- Evidence of effect: this is the clearest measured improvement of the whole period, and it is operational capacity rather than a technical control. Complemented by third-party automated detection now catching things in seconds to minutes: Socket flagged
axiosin ~6 minutes (Huntress) and the crates.io compromise at 07:29:50 UTC on publish day (Socket); GitLab flagged a malicious PyPI version “within 28 seconds” (GitLab); Sonatype’s Repository Firewall “prevented 136,107 attacks in Q1” 2026 (Sonatype Q1 2026).
-
IoC-based upload blocking and cross-registry collaboration
- Adopted by: GitHub began “blocking uploads matching known IoCs” after Shai-Hulud (GitHub); PyPI added registrar takedowns, blocklists, and explicit “cross-registry collaboration” after the phishing wave (PyPI); Maven Central purged mirrored copies of a worm-infected npm-derived artifact within about a day (The Hacker News).
- Evidence of effect: npm’s own UI began surfacing “a warning message about unauthorized publication of the latest version, indicating that the automated review has caught signs of a compromise” during Shai-Hulud 2.0 (BleepingComputer) — evidence the blocking pipeline was live and firing, though not a quantified reduction.
Known gaps and limitations
n.a.in the mitigation column is common and meaningful. For most typosquat and extension incidents, no fetched source describes any ecosystem-level policy change — only takedown of the specific artifact.- Protestware inside the window is thin. The only in-window campaign I could confirm is the 28-package Russian-locale wave tracked by Socket in July 2025. The destructive protestware canon (
node-ipc,colors.js,faker.js) predates January 2024. - Repo-jacking inside the window is research, not confirmed exploitation. MavenGate (January 2024) and the Checkmarx abandoned-assets survey document the attack surface; I found no fetched primary source documenting a measured repo-jacking breach with victim counts in this window.
- Dependency confusion is likely under-represented. Only the Microsoft May 2026 33-package reconnaissance campaign is confirmed from a primary source.
- Sonatype’s 2026 report introduction page renders its headline figures as
00placeholders, so I sourced those numbers from Sonatype’s press release and Q1 2026 index instead (Sonatype, Sonatype press release, Sonatype Q1 2026). - Snyk’s State of Open Source Security is not cited — the fetched Snyk material in this session was the IndonesianFoods incident write-up only.
- Malicious-package counts across Shai-Hulud waves genuinely conflict (186 / 492 / 500+ / 830 / 1,000+) because they were published at different points in a still-spreading campaign. Both ends are reported above rather than reconciled.
- crates.io and RubyGems primary mitigation posts partially inaccessible.
blog.rubygems.org/2025/09/16/trusted-publishing.htmland the July 2025 crates.io development update returned client errors; RubyGems and crates.io trusted-publishing evidence therefore comes from the December 2023 RubyGems post and Socket’s crates.io coverage.